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All surgical procedures carry the potential for adverse events. Dealing with the sequelae of the complications 
and errors that arise in the course of normal 
practice is therefore part and parcel of a 
surgeon’s working life. The challenges and 
stresses that this creates are now well recog-
nised, although surgical training has, until 
recently, done little to help surgeons prepare 
for such events, and ongoing professional 
and personal support is limited.
Two recent books, Atul Gawande’s Com-
plications1 and Henry Marsh’s Do No Harm,2 
have highlighted with searing honesty the 
difficulties that surgeons face when compli-
cations and errors occur during surgery. Wu 
et al have drawn attention to the fact that 
although it is crucial to focus on the needs of 
patients and their families when errors occur, 
it is also important to recognise that surgeons 
may be the ‘second victims’ in such circum-
stances.3,4 This is not least because they must 
respond to the challenge of providing effective 
patient care and may also need to deal with 
the reactions of the patient’s family, with 
the judgements of colleagues and, in some 
cases, with disciplinary or legal proceedings.
Although there are often standard protocols 
in place regarding how to manage patients 




what extent, surgeons need support.5,6 This 
paper examines the evidence on the nature 
of the impact that adverse events have on the 
professional and personal lives of surgeons, 
whether there may be differences in that 
impact for complications versus errors and 
the nature of the support that surgeons 
might require as a result.
It is clear that surgeons live pressured lives 
and that this, in and of itself, can adversely 
affect surgeons’ wellbeing. In  a large study, 
Shanafelt et al surveyed 7,905 members of 
the American College of Surgeons about 
their professional practice, quality of life and 
career satisfaction, as well as depression and 
burnout.7 Given that surgeons in the sample 
typically worked 60 hours per week and were 
on call 2 nights a week, it is perhaps not sur-
prising that 40% of respondents were burned 
out, 30% screened positive for symptoms of 
depression, and quality of life was well below 
the population norm. Importantly, this pres-
sure may lead to mistakes being made. In one 
study, depressed residents made more than 
six times as many medication errors as those 
who were not depressed,8 whereas in another 
the number of errors reported correlated with 
depression, burnout, lower quality of life and 
emotional exhaustion.9
SURGEONS AS SECOND VICTIMS
A recent major review of the burgeoning 
literature on this subject suggests that the 
impact of errors may be considerable.4 It was 
found that the prevalence of second victims 
after adverse events varied from 10% to more 
than 40%, depending on the study. ‘Victims’ 
reported strong negative reactions such as 
anger and irritation, sadness and depression, 
and shame and self-blame.
What is unclear from this review is the 
extent to which the studies included might 
reflect the reactions of surgeons specifically 
to such events, not least because the studies 
encompassed all medical professions.4 In 
addition, the terms on which searches were 
made of research databases were biased 
towards a negative response (eg ‘medical 
error’, ‘burnout’, ‘depression’, ‘empathy’). Of 
the 32 studies included, the majority were 
from relatively small samples and 15 studies 
used qualitative rather than quantitative 
methodologies. Finally, the definition of a 
‘second victim’ is imprecise and based on 
the assumption that individuals have made 
a major error for which they feel personally 
responsible. The perspective presented in 
this review may therefore reflect some but 
not all surgical experiences.
SURGEONS AS RESILIENT INDIVIDUALS
Recent research suggests that, as a group, 
surgeons may have some degree of stress 
immunity. A study examining personal-
ity differences between specialties found 
that surgeons scored more highly on a 
tough-mindedness scale than family prac-
tice physicians and anaesthetists, indicating 
that they were less likely to be distracted 
by emotions when problem-solving.10 
Similarly, Pegrum and Pearce examined the 
personality traits of 172 consultants using 
the Psychopathic Personality Inventory, and 
compared their scores with those of the 
general population.11 They found that inven-
tory scores in the sample were significantly 
higher than  the population norm, with 
particularly high scores on stress immunity. 
Surgeons were among the highest-scoring 
individuals in the sample. The authors 
concluded that the ‘prevalence of stress 
immunity as the overriding personality 
trait in consultants may better facilitate 
patient care’.
Regardless of whether such a conclusion 
is warranted on the basis of these data, the 
study by Pegrum and Pearce implies that sur-
geons may have personality traits that enable 
them to deal with the stressors placed on 
them.11 Such a positive perspective is missing 
in the ‘second victim’ literature and suggests 
that a more balanced approach is warranted 
in which individual differences in resilience 
are examined. Indeed, recent research 
indicates that there is considerable variation 
in both the nature and extent of surgeons’ 
reactions to adverse events, with some being 
much more affected than others.12
In addition to personal resilience, effec-
tive coping strategies are another part of 
the armoury that surgeons have to enable 
them to deal effectively with adverse events. 
Both surgeons12 and other healthcare 
providers13,14 report using a variety of coping 
strategies; these may be problem-focused 
(directed towards changing the relationship 
between the demands of the situation and 
the resources available) or emotion-focused 
(directed towards managing the emotional 
consequences of the stressor). The prob-
lem-focused coping strategies that were 
most commonly reported by surgeons were 
discussing the complications with peers for 
advice, deconstructing the complication 
to identify lessons that could be learnt and 
ensuring skills are up to scratch.12 Common 
emotion-focused strategies included ra-
tionalising by putting what happened into 
perspective, talking openly to patients as a 
way of finding closure, and seeking reassur-
ance from colleagues.
ADVERSE EVENTS: ERRORS, COMPLICATIONS 
AND SYSTEMS
Surgeons’ responses also appear to depend on 
the nature of the adverse event. For example, 
the severity of the outcome and the reactions 
of the patient or his or her family are com-
monly reported determinants of a surgeon’s 
reaction.12,13 Despite obvious variation in the 
severity and nature of adverse events, the 
overwhelming majority of research has treat-
ed errors in an undifferentiated way. It has 
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also focused on errors rather than complica-
tions. This is not helped by the fact that errors 
and complications are not easy to define, and 
are often conflated in the literature.
Previous major studies examining errors 
have used definitions referring to prevent-
able adverse events15–17 that arise when care 
falls short of the standard expected.16,18 Errors 
might therefore be defined as avoidable 
commissions or omissions with potentially 
negative consequences. They would have 
been judged as poor practice by skilled and 
knowledgeable peers at the time when they 
occurred, independently of whether there 
were any negative consequences. Com-
plications, by contrast, are adverse events 
that are an acknowledged risk of surgical 
care (ie when a standard medical procedure 
is undertaken, there are risks that are 
not avoidable).19,20
Despite the fact that complications occur 
much more frequently and are an inevitable 
part of dealing with the risks inherent in sur-
gical procedures, very little is known about 
their impact on surgeons. In a recent UK 
study, Pinto et al interviewed 27 surgeons 
about the personal impact of both compli-
cations and errors.12 While it was suggested 
that errors may have more negative conse-
quences on surgeons’ emotional adjustment 
than complications, no distinction was made 
between the two types of adverse effects 
during data collection. (Surgeons were ‘asked 
to discuss complications without an assump-
tion that these were caused by medical error’ 
but it is clear from the text that ‘complica-
tions’ was an umbrella term that included 
preventable errors.) As a result, this assertion 
is difficult to sustain, particularly given the 
small size of their sample.
Although self-blame is understandably 
common when errors occur (with the 
majority of respondents attributing errors 
to an ‘individual-level factor’ rather than 
to a ‘system issue’),4,9 there is a growing 
literature highlighting the role that systemic 
and organisational factors play in creating 
opportunities for error.21–23 The systemic 
approach assumes that error is inevitable 
but can be reduced and ameliorated through 
appropriate management.
One example of this is the development 
of the surgical safety checklist,24 a simple 
device that helps to enhance performance by 
compensating for the potential limits of hu-
man memory and attention, and by ensuring 
consistency and completeness in carrying 
out surgical tasks.25 Providing ‘checklist 
fatigue’ does not set in, checklists help to 
manage the potential for making mistakes 
merely through being human. Other checks 
designed to support human systems may 
not always be so successful and may actually 
create errors. For example, medical alarms, 
if poorly understood, can create rather than 
reduce errors.26
SUPPORTING SURGEONS
A number of professional bodies have 
recognised the need to support surgeons 
during their careers and have formalised this 
support by creating mentorship programmes. 
UK examples include the Association of Sur-
geons in Training and the London Deanery 
mentorship programmes for surgical train-
ees as well as the Royal College of Physicians 
and Surgeons of Glasgow programme for 
all fellows and members. In addition, many 
National Health Service trusts run in-house 
mentorship schemes. Mentoring, however, is 
deliberately broad in remit and long-term in 
nature, and it encompasses support in many 
aspects of professional and personal learning 
and development. Although undoubtedly 
valuable, it is not designed to prepare sur-
geons for, or to support them through, the 
particular consequences of a complication 
or error.
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The need for further support mechanisms 
has been advocated by practitioners and 
researchers alike who recognise that current 
practice does not meet the psychological 
needs of surgeons or enable them to develop 
strategies to cope with adverse events.12,13,27,28 
It is also encapsulated in the duty of candour 
review.29 The report recognises that in order 
to create a culture where staff disclose 
information about unanticipated events in 
a patient’s care, they need to have training 
and support to do this. We would argue that 
embedded within such an approach should 
be the recognition that the support surgeons 
need will vary depending on the nature of the 
adverse event as well as the personality, cop-
ing strategies and experience of the surgeon.
An important precursor to providing 
appropriately variegated support for surgeons 
in the UK is a better understanding of the 
different facets of adverse events (both compli-
cations and errors) as well as the personal and 
professional impact that they might have. Pre-
vious research in this area has tended to focus 
on healthcare systems outside of the UK, with 
a particular emphasis on the US. Furthermore, 
most of the available studies from both the US 
and Europe have been limited by their small 
sample size, with few representing national 
samples.7 There is a growing preponderance 
of small qualitative studies that provide rich 
(and often compelling) information without 
necessarily being representative at all. This 
is compounded by the emphasis on errors, 
especially relatively rare but serious errors, 
where there may be a risk of litigation.
We aim to conduct a large-scale national 
study in the UK that will generate a quanti-
fied description of the impact on surgeons 
of both complications and errors, to enable 
us to compare their effects and isolate the 
factors that are associated with positive 
and negative impacts. The findings from 
our survey will hopefully provide a detailed 
national picture of the challenges, responses 
and resilience that surgeons have when 
dealing with the adverse events that are 
part and parcel of their working lives. This 
information will form the basis to provide 
more appropriate and better-targeted sup-
port systems, enhancing the quality of both 
surgeons’ professional and personal lives, 
and helping them to use their experiences to 
improve their practice.
Finally, we also recognise that surgeons 
are not unique in being impacted by errors 
and complications – the whole theatre and 
surgical care team may be affected. Our 
planned survey may therefore be the start of 
a much larger process designed to support 
those who care for patients.
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